Article by Brandon J. Weichert April 8, 2021 (asiatimes.com)
• Any conflict between the United States and China would likely begin at sea and in the skies over the Indo-Pacific region. Last month, US Navy Admiral John Aquilino testified before Congress that American forces deployed to the Indo-Pacific are overmatched by their Chinese rivals.
• US military forces and their allies would require unhampered access to satellites in order to defend against Chinese aggression. Nearly 70% of the US Army’s weapons rely on satellites to function. American warships would need to coordinate and communicate with one another and their combatant commands across the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite constellation in geosynchronous orbit, and across the Wideband Global Satcom (WGS) constellation.
• The ubiquitous Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation of satellites is essential for the movement and deployment of US forces, especially in a large area of operation like the Indo-Pacific. Even America’s vaunted nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) satellites could be destroyed in geosynchronous orbit, nullifying America’s nuclear deterrent.
• Denying the Americans access to these vital satellite constellations would be key for any plan by Beijing to invade Taiwan or to capture the South or East China Sea. A “Space Pearl Harbor” would temporarily blind and confuse US forces to create a window of opportunity for China’s ‘People’s Liberation Army’ (PLA) to defeat a confused American military.
• The US military would also attack China’s satellite constellations. But Beijing’s forces are nowhere near as dependent on satellites as are America’s military forces. Also, American forces would wait to be attacked in space before responding in-kind. This gives Beijing the advantage by allowing the PLA escalation dominance in a space war – which would translate to China’s advantage on land, at sea, in the air, and within cyberspace, at least for a short time. Western dithering in the face of Chinese aggression would lead to their defeat.
• China’s leadership knows it does not need to defeat the United States and its allies in a war, they simply need to delay US military power from intervening against their forces long enough for China’s military to achieve their strategic objectives, say, capturing Taiwan. Once captured, China’s leaders believe that their American rivals would be unwilling to commit the resources needed to restore the status quo. China’s leaders would use their crippling defeat of US military forces in the Indo-Pacific as the leverage they’d need to seek a negotiated settlement with Washington to create a new regional paradigm wherein China, not the United States, is the dominant player.
• To deter China from enacting a Space Pearl Harbor, the Biden administration must demand a larger budget for the fledgling Space Force and insist upon a doctrine of satellite defense coupled with total space dominance. It is easier to preserve America’s satellite capabilities in peacetime than it is to try to restore them in war.
• If the United States continues to leave itself vulnerable to attack in the strategic high ground of space, an aggressive and innovative foe like China could exploit such weaknesses in a moment of geopolitical crisis and put another nail in the coffin of America’s superpower status. A China-dominated world order is a development that few outside of Beijing desire.
Admiral John Aquilino testifying before Congress
If a war between China and the United States erupted today, an American victory would not be assured. US Navy Admiral John Aquilino recently testified before Congress that American forces deployed to the Indo-Pacific are overmatched by their Chinese rivals.
Any conflict between the United States and China would likely begin at sea and in the skies over the Indo-Pacific region. Thus the US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps would form the tip of America’s spear in the region.
These US military forces (and their allies) would require untrammeled access to satellites in order to defend against Chinese aggression.
For the US Navy to defend either the South or East China Sea effectively or to assist Taiwan, in the event that China attempted to invade the besieged democratic island-nation, American warships would need to coordinate and communicate with one another and their combatant commands across the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite constellation in geosynchronous orbit.
Nearly 70% of the US Army’s weapons rely on satellites to function. Therefore, another critical set of satellites China might target is the Wideband Global Satcom (WGS) constellation.
The ubiquitous Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation of satellites is essential for the movement and deployment of US forces, especially in a large area of operation like the Indo-Pacific. Even America’s vaunted nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) satellites could be destroyed in geosynchronous orbit, nullifying America’s nuclear deterrent.
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On November 9, General Jay Raymond, the U.S. Space Force’s Chief of Space Operations, released a foundational document outlining the new military service’s priorities and management practices for the U.S. to remain ahead of its major adversaries in space. The 12-page document, “Chief of Space Operations Planning Guidance” (CPG), makes clear that space is now viewed as a “warfighting domain”, and that in order for the U.S. to maintain dominance and deter hostile actions, it needs to take immediate action to integrate, equip, train, and organize its military space assets.
General Raymond warns about the danger posed by major adversaries, such as China and Russia, that have developed sophisticated anti-satellite technologies capable of disrupting or destroying the U.S. satellite grid. Such a possibility was first outlined in a January 11, 2001, Space Commission Report, chaired by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, warning about a “Space Pearl Harbor” and the need for a new military service to prevent it
General Raymond begins his Planning Guidance document by explaining how space has shifted from a benign security environment to one where warfare can be expected in the near future:
The Space Force has a mandate in national strategy, policy, and law to be both pathfinder and protector of America’s interests as a space-faring nation. The convergence of proliferating technology and competitive interests has forever re-defined space from a benign domain to one in which we anticipate all aspects of human endeavor – including warfare. The return of peer, great power competitors has dramatically changed the global security environment and space is central to that change (CPG, p.1).
According to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, space was considered to be a peaceful domain for scientific exploration. No country was allowed to station military forces or weapons in space, the Moon, or other celestial objects. General Raymond is here acknowledging that recent developments such as Russia and China’s deployment of a range of anti-satellite weapons systems mean that space is no longer a benign environment, and that preventative military measures need to be taken.
He goes on to explain how the Space Force can prepare for future warfare in space:
The United States Space Force is called to organize, train, equip, and present forces capable of preserving America’s freedom of action in space; enabling Joint Force lethality and effectiveness; and providing independent options – in, from, and to space… While we will extend and defend America’s competitive advantage in peacetime, the ultimate measure of our readiness is the ability to prevail should war initiate in, or extend to space (CPG, p.1).
Deterring major adversaries from launching military hostilities is explained as a key priority in order not to lose U.S. space dominance:
America needs a Space Force able to deter conflict, and if deterrence fails, prevail should war initiate in or extend to space. Space capabilities enhance the potency of all other military forces. Our National leadership requires resilient and assured military space capabilities for sustained advantage in peaceful competition, or decisive advantage in conflict or war….
The change in the geo-strategic and operating environment that compelled the creation of the Space Force means that many of our legacy space capabilities must be reevaluated for ongoing relevance. Let me be clear – if we do not adapt to outpace aggressive competitors, we will likely lose our peacetime and warfighting advantage in space (CPG, p.2).
China and Russia are both viewed as the primary adversaries capable of militarily destroying the U.S. satellite grid in a future war or in a surprise attack, a Space Pearl Harbor:
Chinese and Russian military doctrines indicate they view space as essential to modern warfare, and view counterspace capabilities as potent means to reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness. Modern Chinese and Russian space surveillance networks are capable of finding, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all earth orbits. Both Russia and China are developing systems using the electro-magnetic spectrum, cyberspace, directed energy, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based antisatellite missiles to destroy space-based assets (CPG, p.2).
From the perspective of China’s Communist Party leadership, as I explain in Rise of the Red Dragon (2020), China is merely catching up to what the United States (and Russia) had already secretly developed and deployed in space decades earlier.
Not surprisingly, General Raymond emphasizes developing breakthrough space technologies in dealing with potential military conflict:
Space Force will use strategic investments to cultivate a strong, diverse and competitive American space industrial base. Civil and commercial developments that pave the way for exploration and commercialization beyond near-Earth orbit will both generate technology that benefits the USSF and require an order of magnitude expansion of our ability to sense, communicate and act to protect and defend American interests in cis-lunar space and beyond. (CPG, p.9).
General Raymond is here suggesting major aerospace defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Boeing, etc., will play vital roles in developing breakthrough space technologies that can be used to deter adversaries in space. While development of breakthrough space technologies is framed as a future need, the reality is that such technologies have already been secretly developed by major aerospace companies. The produced technologies have been subsequently sold off to different “customers” such as U.S. military commands, intelligence agencies, and major allies for decades.
Extensive testimonial and documentary evidence is presented in my Secret Space Programs book series showing how the U.S. Air Force and the Navy developed separate secret space programs in response to earlier developments in Nazi Germany that carried over into the post-war era. As a result of decades-long cooperation with major corporations in reverse engineering captured Nazi and alien spacecraft, advanced anti-gravity spacecraft and electromagnetic weapons systems were developed and deployed by different entities within the US national security establishment.
The critical requirement for gaining access to such breakthrough aerospace technologies by a U.S. military service, combatant command, or intelligence agency was to demonstrate a clear need for such advanced technologies for completing space-related missions.
As long as space was considered a benign environment, then this favored the acquisition of reverse-engineered technologies by intelligence services or special operations groups that used space for intelligence gathering or small-scale covert operations. The bulk of breakthrough aerospace technologies would consequently go to defense intelligence entities such as the National Reconnaissance Office, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and covert groups such as Air Force Special Operations and Special Operations Command.
Even U.S. Space Command (1985-2002) and Air Force Space Command (1982-2019) would be limited in how much access they had to such breakthrough “black world” technologies as acknowledged in a comprehensive 1996 Intelligence Commission report to the US Congress:
Two organizations within the Department of Defense manage space assets: the U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) is responsible for so-called “white world” satellites (i.e., satellites that are publicly acknowledged) for military programs, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) deals with “black world” (i.e., classified) satellites for intelligence programs. SPACECOM launches and operates satellites for military communication, weather and navigation, which are designed and procured by the military services. NRO designs, acquires, launches, and operates classified reconnaissance satellites.
The Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified combatant commanders, with the notable exceptions of Special Operations Command and (Air Force) Space Command, were largely denied access. This was because major military space operations were deemed unnecessary due to space being considered a benign environment, and such operations violating international space law.
All that changes with General Raymond’s Planning Guidance document, which expands upon President Donald Trump’s earlier Space Policy Directive 4 which made space a hostile environment requiring defense of America’s space assets. Space is now considered a war fighting domain where large scale military operations may be necessary to protect the U.S. satellite grid. This means that breakthrough corporate technologies that previously were denied to the different military services due to their high-level security classification and international space law constraints, are now permitted either through Space Force (which incorporates the former USAF Space Command) or U.S. Space Command, both of which were respectively created or reconstituted in 2019.
General Raymond emphasizes the haste with which these advanced technologies should now be incorporated into Space Force and for immediate action to be taken to protect the U.S. satellite grid:
The strategic environment demands we act boldly now to build a Service designed to act with speed and decisiveness to ensure the United States maintains its advantage in the domain….This CPG identifies those characteristics and capabilities within the force that must evolve. We do not have the luxury of delay for further analysis. (CPG, p.9).
Raymond’s thinking is mirrored in recent statements by the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, Barbara Barret, calling for declassifying many space technologies kept hidden from the general public and even from different elements of the Air Force itself. On December 7, 2019, she declared:
Declassifying some of what is currently held in secure vaults would be a good idea… You would have to be careful about what we declassify, but there is much more classified than what needs to be.
In conclusion, redefining space as a warfighting domain means that formerly highly classified technologies developed by corporations and military laboratories for exclusive use by the intelligence and special operations communities will be acquired by Space Force. These advanced space technologies will be made available for large scale deployment in future space combat operations.
The release of General Raymond’s “Planning Guidance” document makes it highly likely that soon after Space Force is fully set up by May 2021 (the end of its 18 months set up period), we are likely to witness the official disclosure of multiple highly classified aerospace technologies, including anti-gravity propulsion systems, acquired by Space Force. The release of such advanced technologies will revolutionize the civilian transportation industry and military defense and take our planet into an exciting but dangerous new age.
would not be assured. US Navy Admiral John Aquilino recently testified before Congress that American forces deployed to the Indo-Pacific are overmatched by their Chinese rivals.
For the US Navy to defend either the South or East China Sea effectively or to assist
Taiwan, in the event that China attempted to invade the besieged democratic island-nation, American warships would need to coordinate and communicate with one another and their combatant commands across the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite constellation in geosynchronous orbit.